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Trust in corporations, governments and public services has been steadily declining over the last few decades. Lack of transparency and 
auditability has been a key driver for this decline. Blockchain technology has been commended as a solution that can help with 
disintermediation and filling the consistently increasing trust challenges faced by the corporate and public sectors. Public services are 
seeking solutions that can help establish trust and increase transparency with its citizens and businesses are undertaking extensive 
business analysis to determine the need and effectiveness of blockchain-like platforms as the basis for transforming their existing 
platforms. Due to the decisive nature, most of the analysis results thus indicate that if a trusted third party is an option, then blockchain 
should not be used. Here we highlight the challenges and opportunities of establishing trust and how blockchain technology can help 
public services bridge the trust gap with its citizens. We argue that all information technology systems rely on a suite of technologies, 
thus blockchain should be added to the current technology stack rather than taking an ‘all or nothing’ approach. We also argue that 
analysing the effectiveness of futuristic technology like blockchain with industrial age methodology and mindset may limit the realisation 
of its impact on society and economy. Therefore, we propose to take a heuristic approach, where different properties of blockchain 
technology need to be mapped against different aspects of current business process with a futuristic view in mind. Taking Companies 
House – a government organisation that holds over 4 million UK-based companies’ records – as an example, we demonstrate how 
certain business processes in Companies House can benefit from adapting a blockchain-based solution. 
Keywords: trust, blockchain, public services, distributed ledger technology, business process 
JEL Classifications: C8, C9, I2, L3, O31 
 
 
1.   Introduction 
Sir Mark Walport, the UK government’s chief scientific 
adviser (2013–2017), states in his 2015 report that ‘in 
distributed ledger technology we may be witnessing one of 
those explosions of creative potential that catalyse exceptional 
levels of innovation. The technology could prove to have the 
capacity to deliver a new kind of trust to a wide range of 
services’. [1]. Joseph Schumpeter coined the term ‘creative 
destruction’ to explain how the process of industry 
transformation revolutionises the economic structure from 
within, by destroying the existing one and simultaneously 
creating a new one [2]. Carlota Perez took the notion further 
to explain how technological revolutions driven by ‘creative 
destruction’ redefine not only an industry but also the 
infrastructures and economic institutions surrounding it 
[3]. Perez called the phenomenon of the diffusion of new 
technologies that spread and proliferate their impact across 
economies and eventually transform the socio-institutional 
structure a ‘techno-economic paradigm’ (TEP) [4]. As the 
technology evolves, the way businesses and work are organised 
transforms along with it. Public and private institutions 
frequently re-evaluate their business models to take advantage 
of the technological innovations. Furthermore, the technology 
influences the business model possibilities [5]. We have 
witnessed this in the shape of assembly lines during industrial 
revolution, office work with the introduction of computers 
and life as we know it since the World Wide Web (WWW). 
The economies now are data driven. Organisations collect and 
process data at a rate never seen before. Since data has value 
and utility, it encourages hackers and criminals to exploit 
vulnerabilities in the information technology infrastructure of 
the organisations, leading to all sorts of hacks and breaches. 
Blockchain technology (BCT) has seen its utility for 
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personal data [6, 7], secure data sharing [8], access 
management [9], data integrity [10] and digital identities [11]. 
However, analogous to any other disruptive technical 
breakthrough, when the horizon is unclear and uncertainty is 
high, there is a substantial hype around BCT. 
The ‘Gartner Hype Cycle’ illustrates the typical progression 
of an innovation, from the phases of inflated expectations 
through disillusionment to a realisation of the relevance of 
the innovation and its applications [12]. BCT has been one 
of the considerably hyped technologies and has been on the 
Gartner Hype Cycle for the recent few years. The world has 
witnessed the initial coin offer bubble, to the ‘blockchain 
for everything’ bubble and now we are seeing the 
exploration of serious use cases. Several industries have 
spent billions of dollars exploring the blockchain use cases 
for their business models. International Data Corporation 
forecasts the spending on blockchain solutions (including 
Distributed ledger technologies (DLTs)) in 2023 to 
approximately $15.9 billion, with a compound annual 
growth rate of 60.2% [13]. 
With such potential of growth, businesses seek guidance to 
help them decide if blockchain is a potential solution to their 
use case. Several different decision schemes have been 
proposed over the recent years to assist businesses in 
determining if BCT is the right solution for their use case. 
However, since the technology is relatively recent and quite 
distinct, several proposed schemes conclude differently. Koens 
and Poll [14] analysed 30 blockchain decision schemes and 
found several contradictions between those schemes, arguing 
that most of them were inherently flawed [14]. Twenty out of 
the thirty schemes that Koens and Poll studied argued that if a 
trusted third party (TTP) can be used then blockchain should be avoided. 
However, we argue that this argument contradicts the basic 
ethos of Satoshi Nakamoto’s design of the bitcoin blockchain 
and the whole principle of decentralised trust.  
In his landmark paper titled ‘Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer 
Electronic Cash System’, S. Nakamoto writes: ‘What is needed 
is an electronic payment system based on cryptographic proof 
instead of trust, allowing any two willing parties to transact 
directly with each other without the need for a trusted third 
party’ [15]. Nakamoto has noted down only one condition for 
transacting on the bitcoin blockchain and that is ‘willingness to 
transact’. There is no further reasoning on only when the 
transacting parties should use the blockchain-based payment 
system (Bitcoin). If Nakamoto was to follow the same 
principle of ‘is there a trusted third party that the transacting 
parties can use?’ then bitcoin may not have been 
conceptualized, since the transacting parties can potentially 
‘trust’ the conventional banking system. Therefore, we argue 
that the potential use cases of blockchain should be explored 
with an open mind and vision for future, so that the future 
potential applications and implausible solutions that the 
blockchain might hold are not excluded. 
In this article we first establish the definition of trust in the 
online and offline world, followed by different forms of trust. 
Secondly, we compare the pros and cons of having a trusted 
third-party system or a blockchain-based system. Here we 
argue that the selection of blockchain (or blockchain-based 
systems) should not be an ‘all or nothing’ approach against 
current systems, but it should be aligned with business and 
process innovations, as it was noticed by Perez [4] and Fuller 
and Haefliger [5]. Thirdly and finally, we take Companies 
House UK (CH) as an example to demonstrate how BCT can 
improve or replace some of the current business processes, 
aiming at increasing trust, transparency, information integrity, 
cost reduction and efficient processing. 
2.   What is Trust? 
Trust is paramount for the society to function. Nobel laureate 
Arrow called trust ‘a lubricant for social systems’ [16]. There is 
no agreed-upon definition of trust, but several definitions have 
emerged from multiple disciplines [17]. One of the widely 
cited definition of trust by Mayer, Davis and Schoorman is 
‘the willingness of a party to be vulnerable to the actions of 
another party based on the expectation that the other will 
perform a particular action important to the trustor, 
irrespective of the ability to monitor and control that other 
party’ [18]. For example, when we need purchase online, we 
trust the seller to send us the same product that we have 
purchased, without having any control over it.  
Trust is often classified into broad categories [18, 21] such as 
calculative (based on rational choices), relational (derived from 
repeated interactions), organizational (based on expectations 
from an organisation) and institutional trust. Institutional trust 
refers to the confidence of individuals (trustor) in public 
institutions (trustee) such as military, parliament, police and 
other public services on a macro level [20]. While some 
scholars regard trust as a personal or inter-personal attribute 
[21, 22], others consider trust as an institutional property [23, 
[24, 25]. Even though the later acknowledge the importance of 
social trust, they argue that social controls, personal bonds or 
local mechanisms may work well within limited social 
boundaries, but formal institutions are of critical importance 
to establish cross-situational trust where direct personal 
contact is very limited [25]. However, trust is subjective and 
evolves with the societal shifts. 
Miles and Creed [26] noted over two decades ago that the 
society was moving towards ‘small-scale’ relations where there 
would be a rise of independent contractors and flexible forms 
of organisations resulting in the breaking up of large firms. 
Miles and Creed [26] argued that it will result in the shift in 
predominant forms of trust. Furthermore, Saxenian [27] 
noticed a shift from institutional trust to individual and 
network-based trust. Neil et al have argued that social distance 
has an impact on the trust level [28]. The authors suggest that 
distributed teams with minimal physical or cultural contact 
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functioning at the minimal social distance, which operate at 
the highest level of trust. 
Trust is critical for businesses and individuals to transact. 
Since, in most cases, the transacting parties do not trust each 
other, a TTP is usually chosen to facilitate the transaction. The 
TTP acts as a gateway to establish trust. A strong assumption 
of trust reduces transaction cost, agency issues (entity acting 
on behalf of someone else to conduct a transaction) and 
governance expenses. It also helps to improve relationships, 
supports decision making when information is scarce and 
supports cooperation [29, 30]. The development of 
organizational ecology [31], institutional theory [32] and 
transaction cost economics [33] have all been underpinned by 
the assumption that organizations are the centralized source of 
trust and legitimacy [34]. 
Even though these assumptions have been historically 
effective, the recent emergence of distributed trust systems 
such as BCT has fundamentally challenged these core tenets of 
organizational theory [35]. 
3.   Centralised vs Distributed Trust 
In centralised trust, the trust is embedded in a central authority 
or institution and the transacting parties assume that the 
central authority will act in their best interest, following all 
written and unwritten rules. Examples of centralised trust are 
banking, public services, stockbrokers and so on. A TTP is 
inherently centralised. All users of such centralised system are 
by default required to rely on the trusted party for the 
provision of truth and assume that the trusted party will act 
selflessly in their best interest. This saturation of power leads 
to a single point of failure, both in technical and social terms. 
The top-down coordination and hierarchical structures like 
governments, bureaucracy and centralised public services have 
been the solution to the ever-growing trust problem and 
facilitate mutual interactions among distant societies. Even 
though these centralised institutions have historically served 
their purpose, organizations with top-down centralized 
coordination and hierarchical structures tend to be inherently 
inefficient [36]. Furthermore, this concentration of power in 
the hands of few poses significant threats, such as corruption, 
misuse of power, lack of transparency and even regression into 
authoritarianism [36]. 
In decentralised trust, trust is disseminated to a decentralised 
network (DLTs, for the sake of this article), so no one entity has 
the sole power or monopoly over the act of transacting. By doing 
so, DLTs shift the trust from a central authority to a network of 
participants while simultaneously enabling shared information and 
governance. Bitcoin transactions, smart contracts and 
decentralised autonomous organisations (DAO) are examples of 
decentralised trust. DLTs lower the uncertainty regarding the 
otherwise ‘non-trusting’ parties and allow them to transact 
without the need of a mutually trusted party [37]. However, this 
new trust enabler for exchange of information does not 
completely remove the need of trust but shifts the trust from 
intermediaries and institutions to the technology (the peer-to-peer 
network, cryptographic protocols, code, smart contracts, etc).  
The lack of trust and need of establishing trust have always 
been there; however, until DLTs, centralised trust was the only 
dominant form of trust known to the world. The societal shift 
noted by Miles and Creed [26] along with a shift in trust 
(Saxenian) [27] enabled by the TEP [4] has led to the creation 
of behemoths such as Uber, Google, Amazon and Facebook 
which have now become the de-facto monopolies, leading to 
centralisation and single point of failure, among other socio-
political issues.  
4.   The Cost of De-facto Trust 
The cost of trust can be established in two ways (1) the cost of 
establishing the trust and (2) the repercussions when trust is 
breached. During the 2007–2008 economic crisis, 1.3 million 
people were made redundant in the United Kingdom, and 10 
years later, we were still, on average, 30 pounds a week worse 
off than we were before the crash [38]. One of the key triggers 
of the 2007–2008 economic crisis was the bankruptcy of a 
158-year-old business, Lehman Brothers. Only 9 months prior 
to declaring bankruptcy, Lehman brothers reported a record 
revenue and profit which was endorsed by their auditors Ernst 
& Young (EY) [39]. In the end, the organisations responsible 
for the biggest economic crisis since the great depression 
shrunk their responsibility to be only the agent of trust in a 
transaction; however, the consequences of their negligence are 
still felt to this day. 
Furthermore, a dominant third party in any given industry 
poses a risk to become the ‘gatekeeper’ for that industry. This 
highly saturated centralisation, where trust is not a choice but a 
requirement, risks exclusion and monopoly. In the recent 
turmoil of events, the United States has threatened to shut 
down Iraq’s access to the country’s central bank held at the 
Federal Reserve Bank of New York where all funds of global 
oil sales are kept, depriving them from all the oil sale revenue, 
leading them to an economic crisis [40].  
Even if the trusted central authority is honest, it poses risks to 
data manipulation by external parties such as hackers. A 
hacker may modify the vital information and cause significant 
losses without even being noticed. Consider, for example, if 
the hackers were to alter the expiry dates on the batches of 
milk. Valuable resource would be discarded and numerous 
may get sick for drinking the hazardous milk. Volkswagen’s 
emission scandal is a recent example of data manipulation in 
order to pass the safety or legal requirement [34]. The same 
principle can be applied to medical institutions, banks and 
public services, leading to appalling consequences.   
 
Breach in trust has a significant and lasting impact on the 
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People will forget about the third party that was the main reason 
of the breach, but the brands will face ongoing trust issues. 
5.   Trust and Society 
Trust in centralised entities is declining. According to a 2018 
study by Ipsos Mori on a base of over 16,000 respondents, 
only 14% deemed government as trustworthy [41]. Similarly, 
media, oil and gas companies, banking and pharmaceutical 
companies were highly rated as untrustworthy. When the 
respondents were asked if ‘it [bank and public sector] is open 
and transparent about what it does’, only 26% and 23% 
agreed, respectively [41]. A 2015 study of Pew Research 
Center, USA, indicates that the public’s trust in the federal 
government has been steadily declining since 1958 and it is at 
historically low levels with only 19% of Americans having 
reported to trust the government [42]. 
Not only the trust in organisations is at decline but the trust in 
people is declining too. The general social survey (GSS) has 
recorded a downward trend to the ‘can people be trusted’ 
category, over the past 32 years (Figure 1) (1972–2018, data 
available for 28 out of 32 years) [43]. Wilson & Rule found a 
prejudiced relationship between the perception of 
‘untrustworthiness’ from facial appearance and death 
sentences given to convicted murderers, even for the people 
exonerated after originally being sentenced to death [44]. 
 
  
Figure 1. General social survey (GSS) ‘Can people be trusted’ 
(1972–2018 dataset). Declining trust among people  
with only 33% responding that they can trust other  
people as compared to 48% in 1972 [43]. 
Higher level of trust has a positive casual effect on the 
efficiency of public services, tax compliance, anti-corruption 
and participation in civic activities [45]. On the contrary, lack 
of trust serves as a motivation for citizens to not comply with 
government demands and regulations. They may actively resist 
government policies and make the government incapable of 
performing its tasks [46]. Tyler argues that trust helps reduce 
the public sector’s administrative costs of control and 
enforcement by encouraging citizens to voluntarily comply 
and perform their due  diligence [47]. 
The socio-political and technical indicators [2, 3, 4] are hauling 
up that BCT is ready for disruption and can flourish between 
the fissures between human and institutional behaviour. We 
call it ‘digital disruption 2.0’. The first wave of online 
disruption saw the brick and mortar businesses being displaced 
by the digital intermediaries. The digital disruption 2.0 is 
challenging the whole notion of a ‘trusted intermediary’ and 
shifting trust from people and institutions to code and 
computers in impending industry 4.0 revolution. 
6.   When Can You Use a Blockchain? 
Blockchains come with some intrinsic properties, given some 
degree of variation between public and private blockchains. 
Some of the key features of a blockchain are (1) decentralisation 
(transactions without a central authority), (2) persistency (very 
temper evident and strictly validated against the set rules), (3) 
anonymity (no central party keeping user’s private information), 
(4) auditability (all transactions have a log) and (5) resiliency (no 
single point of failure) [48, 49] (see [49] for a literature review 
on the characteristics of blockchains). We must take a heuristic 
approach when designing systems and make use of the 
combination of these properties, if and as needed.  
There has been a lot of debate about when a blockchain makes 
sense. Similar to the mid 1990s, when only a handful of people 
could predict the emergence of the behemoths like Google, 
Facebook and Amazon, we believe that it is too early to really 
conclude on the potential usability of the technology. The social 
shift, along with change in the user’s perception and awareness 
would determine what ends up on the distributed, temper evident 
ledger. We believe that the ‘killer apps’ of the BCT are being 
conceived. These ideas will not be able to progress if we strictly 
evaluate them against the established technologies.  
However, some of the key areas where most of the 
organisations can benefit from a blockchain-based solution are 
reduced verification costs, cost of exchanging value without 
relying on an intermediary, data integrity and reduction in 
frictions [50] 
7.   Public Service Perspective 
As discussed in section 5, trust in public services and 
governments is decreasing. Public services can benefit from 
incorporating a decentralised infrastructure as a tool to gain 
the trust of the people. BCT can provide an infrastructure for 
exchanging information between public services and 
significantly enhance the administrative function of the 
governments by reducing the complexity, cost and time in 
inter-governmental and public information exchange. Citizens 
can benefit from the increased automation, accountability, 
auditability and transparency of the information available on 
the public registries [51].  
Ølnes et al suggest that BCT can be potentially used for any 
transaction or information exchange which involves 
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cases of BCT are secure information exchange, asset 
registry, both tangible assets like land and property and 
digital assets like reputation, health data, patents and ideas 
and inter/intra-governmental transactions [52]. BCT can 
increase government’s efficiency and help in reducing 
corruption [53], improve digital security, privacy and 
enhance trust with its citizens [49]. Furthermore, BCT can 
improve data integrity both in terms of accuracy and 
consistency of the information, leading to error reductions 
and low infrastructure costs [54]. 
Table 1. Countries exploring BCT use cases worldwide with an 
aim of improving public services and trust with their citizens. 
Government service Country Potential benefit 
Land title registry 
Georgia [55] [51], 
Sweden [56], United 
Kingdom [57], Ghana 




Birth certificates India [61], Brazil [62] Provenance, transparency 
Academic/skill 
certificates 













Remittance Philippines [66] Financial  inclusion 
Immigration services Finland [67] Governance 




Business registry Malta [69] Governance, efficiency 












Clearing system for 
imports and exports South Korea [74] 
Efficiency, 
traceability 
Digital currency Tunisia, Ecuador [75] Governance 
Secure data exchange Abu Dhabi (UAE) [70] Digital security 
Medical (organ donation 
and transplant) UAE [70] Efficiency 
Taxation China [76] Transparency, compliance 
Governments across the world acknowledge the potential of 
BCT to transform the public services and citizen’s 
expectations and they have been actively exploring the BCT 
use cases to improve on the existing public services 
infrastructure. Table 1 lists some of the countries that have 
evaluated BCT projects to improve the services for its 
citizens.  
We do not assume that BCT will completely eliminate the role 
of institutions or governments, but we believe that we will see 
a shift in the roles. While BCT can (to some extent) 
disintermediate the role of institutions in record keeping and 
establishing trust, we must appreciate the fact that BCT 
requires governance and regulatory frameworks to operate 
legitimately. Governments can act as trusted administrators 
who manage the registry and define transaction rules and 
regulations to ensure the functioning of the facility. 
Governments must remain the data stewards – accountable 
for running the operations and be accountable for any failures 
or issues [49]. BCT can act as a trust enabling technology layer, 
operating in conjunction with the existing technology stack. 
Organisations globally are pushing for transparency and 
information sharing to provide better service and improved 
transparency. Section 35 of the recently passed Digital 
Economy Act (UK) encourages data sharing among public 
services to improve the public service delivery for the benefit 
of individuals or households and provide targeted public 
service [77]. Since the focus of this article is CH, we will only 
discuss the challenges that CH face to establish trust in the 
data that they hold, simultaneously improving transparency 
and accuracy in the processes of corporations and the activities 
of persons behind those corporations. The aim for addressing 
these challenges is to reduce fraud, money laundering, tax 
evasion and general bad behaviour. 
About Companies House UK 
CH is the UK’s executive agency and the registrar of 
companies. All types of companies are incorporated and 
registered with CH and file-specific details, as per Companies 
Act 2006 [78]. The data held is of high importance to the UK’s 
economy, and CH is aiming to improve the quality of the data 
that they hold, with a focus on increasing the transparency of 
UK corporate entities, and help combat economic crime [79]. 
CH recently consulted on a proposal regarding the newly 
proposed reforms. The reforms will require companies to 
disclose additional information which will be verified before 
acceptance and the steps to be taken to improve the exchange 
of intelligence between CH and UK Law Enforcement. The 
reforms will include knowing (1) who is incorporating, 
managing and controlling companies, (2) improving the 
usability and accuracy of data on the companies register, (3) 
ensuring compliance and protecting personal information on 
the register and (4) sharing intelligence and other measures to 
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Here we investigate how BCT can improve the existing 
processes in CH and discuss three use cases that we have 
examined as part of our research partnership with CH. The 
use cases that we have chosen as part of the study are 
1.   Company incorporation, 
2.   Sharing information with law enforcement (LE) and 
3.   A blockchain-based legal entity identification and 
verification system that can add trust to the data 
collected and held by Companies House. 
Company Incorporation 
CH has a record of over 4 million limited companies 
registered in the United Kingdom and over 500,000 new 
companies are incorporated each year [80]. Each newly 
registered company gets an incorporation certificate as a proof 
that they are legally entitled to trade in the United Kingdom. 
The incorporation certificate is a public document and is only 
issued once to a company in its lifetime. We believe that 
issuing a proof of the incorporation certificates on the 
blockchain can increase the trust in the certificate while 
simultaneously protecting the integrity of the certificate. 
Moreover, the process can be easily integrated in the current 
workflow, since the only addition to the current certificate 
issuance process is committing a transaction with the hash of 
the document to the blockchain. Once the confirmation is 
received, the reference of the transaction is added to the 
metadata of the certificate and is made available for the user. 
For verification, the verifier can upload the certificate to the 
online portal. Proof of the transaction is obtained from the 
metadata of the document and verification is successful if a 
valid hash is found on the blockchain. 
One could argue that the owner of the certificate should hold 
the private keys of the transaction to prove the ownership. 
However, we believe that this requires a lot more awareness 
and hinders the usability and acceptance of the scheme. The 
model discussed here is very similar to some of the current 
semi-automated verification processes and abstracts all caveats 
of the BCT from the end user. 
Information Sharing With Other Public Services 
A private-permissioned blockchain network can facilitate the 
sharing of confidential information among public services [81]. 
Smart contacts can be deployed for access control and data 
handling. We recommend not adding any confidential data to 
the blockchain but only adding a commitment or a proof to 
the network [82]. For example, consider a scenario where LE 
has to request data from CH regarding an ongoing 
investigation. LE shall submit a data protection request, 
requesting the data on the person. Upon successful 
verification, CH prepares the data, encrypts and uploads it to a 
safe storage such as cloud or IPFS [83]. CH will then encrypt 
the link to the data using LE’s public key and post it on DLT 
along with the data hash for integrity checks. LE decrypts the 
link, verifies hash and accesses the data. A smart contract 
facilitating and governing the transaction will remove the link 
and data will be deleted once the requirement has been 
satisfied. Sharing information on a DLT provides a complete 
secure audit trail of the activity.  
Identity System for Legal Entities 
Accurately identifying legal entities on a global scale is a 
complex task, requiring significant amount of time, money and 
resources. There is no single open and up-to-date database 
that can provide all the required background information. This 
lack of information is partially responsible for the financial 
crisis, fraud and market abuse. Several initiatives have been 
taken to identify the global legal entities and their connections 
to each other. Established by the Financial Stability Board in 
June 2014, the Global Legal Entity Identifier Foundation 
(GLEIF) is the most renowned of all. GLEIF is tasked to 
support the implementation and use of the Legal Entity 
Identifier (LEI), with an aim of having a unique identity for 
every business [84]. A total of 1.4 million LEIs have been 
issued to the companies worldwide [85]. This number is only a 
small fraction of the companies registered worldwide. There 
are estimated 200 million registered companies globally; China 
alone has over 77 million registered companies. Less than 
140,000 of the 4 million registered companies in the United 
Kingdom has an LEI [86]. The LEI is not global in a true 
sense since less than 1% companies globally have an LEI. 
Furthermore, companies and individuals will not always trust a 
centralised system managed by a third party. We propose a 
global company and individual identifier system that runs on 
the blockchain and benefits from the inherent security and 
privacy features of a cryptographically secured distributed 
ledger. We believe that a blockchain-based company and 
related person’s network can be a potential solution for CH 
initiative on transparent and reliable data. The architecture 
proposed is based on the open source identity network, Sovrin 
[11] (Figure 2). 
On an abstract level, identity is a composite of (1) identifiers 
that the subject has with different stakeholders, (2) self-
asserted and verifiable claims and (3) proofs from others about 
the relation and interaction with others. We propose using 
self-asserted and verifiable claims [11] to establish trust among 
the interacting entities and the individuals controlling those 
entities. Blockchain network records the claims that a subject 
makes about themselves and their company, respectively. All 
relationships with stakeholders are also recorded as the 
public/private key pairs. The relationships can assign claims to 
the subject or the company. For example, Her Majesty 
Revenue and Customs (HMRC) can assert a claim about Bob’s 
company that it has defaulted or CH can assert a claim about 
the records being up to date. These claims can then be used to 
make disclosures about the identity, which can be verified by 
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Figure 2. Different aspects of identity on the blockchain. 
Entities have identifiers, claims about identity attributes  
and proofs from others regarding their relationships. 
Relationships with other entities are recorded on the 
blockchain and entities collect verifiable claims about  
their identity. Solid lines represent relationships, whereas 
dotted lines represent a verifiable claim disclosure and the 
dashed line represents a delegated claim from a third 
party. The longer they are on the blockchain, the more 
verifiable claims they will collect from the relations they 
have on the blockchain. Entities can disclose verifiable 
claims to a third party, on need basis. Entities can mix and 
match certain aspects of their identities without revealing 
more than what is required. This helps in  
preserving privacy. Legend shows different relationships 
and proofs that an identity can have. Any participant in 
the network will have different identifiers that it uses to 
identify itself. 
Data Sharing and Fraud Mitigation 
A network of this capacity can be easily scaled to hundreds 
if not thousands of nodes. Data can be shared easily 
between governments, LE and other stakeholders such as 
insurance agencies. Privacy of the entity is preserved using 
Zero Knowledge Proofs (ZKP) and relevant data can be 
disclosed easily. On a blockchain identity infrastructure 
with verifiable claims asserting the truth about an entity’s 
identity, fraud becomes extremely difficult. Department of 
Work and Pensions (DWP), CH, HMRC, banks and so on 
will all see Bob as the director of the company and forging 
Bob’s identity would be nearly impossible in this trust 
network (Figure 2). Furthermore, we propose a relative 
ranking-based system that gives a score to each legal entity 
based on their relations and interactions on the blockchain 
(Figure 3). This also makes the KYC (know your customer) 
and on-boarding process easy. Businesses can significantly 
benefit from such a system that cuts their KYC and on-
boarding process from weeks to minutes, not to mention 
the cost savings that come with it. 
  
Figure 3. (a) Real Bob with several trusted verifiable claims on 
the left and (b) imposter Bob with few claims about his 
identity. If Bob is proved to be a malicious person, both  
Tom and Peter risk losing their score too, hence they will have 
to vote for the real Bob in order to preserve their  
own identity score.  
Inter-company Trust 
An infrastructure like bitcoin for intercompany settlements 
can be very helpful as a source of trust in today’s accounting 
structure. It can be used to verify the integrity of records, 
providing a complete audit trail. Companies can write 
transactions directly into a joint register instead of keeping 
separate records based on the receipts of transactions. BCT 
enables the creation of an interlocking system of durable 
accounting records, making the destruction or falsification of 
information to conceal activity practically impossible [87]. 
BCT can be a digital equivalent of a notary. This will save 
significant time for the verifiers as they need not dig into piles 
of paper to verify the books. Transaction becomes the 
evidence itself. 
8.   Conclusion 
BCT could drastically reduce the cost of trust, introduce new 
social constructs and pave the way to new structures of 
economic organisations. While we appreciate the fact that 
BCT has a long way to go before it can be widely adapted, we 
argue that different aspects of BCT should be utilised in 
business models where it can add value. A more appropriate 
question could be ‘do you want to use a trusted third party?’ 
rather than ‘can you use a trusted third party?’ DLTs such as 
BCT are paving the path of a new secure, honest and level-
playing field for all and we shall see mass economies emerging 
from this new form of trust model. 
We took three use cases from Companies House UK’s 
business processes and mapped them to the properties of 
BCT, demonstrating how adding BCT to the existing Tech 
Stack can add an additional level of security to CH data, while 
also improving on the trust in the data held at CH. We believe 
that a solution utilizing digital identities and verifiable claims 
can truly transform the trust factor in companies and 
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